Modi and Xi Jinping are scheduled to meet at Tianjin on the sidelines of the SCO leaders’ summit on August 31-September 1.
The Diplomat, 21st August 25
China’s stern-faced Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a series of meetings in New Delhi on August 18 and 19, on a trip to India that was aimed at restoring high-level dialogue between Asia’s two largest powers.
Wang’s primary meeting was with India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval. Both of them are designated “special representatives” (SRs) of their governments. In this capacity, they co-chair a high-powered negotiation track that is empowered to deal with complicated political dimensions of the border dispute that are beyond the purview of the official working groups.
Since 2003, when the SR dialogue was instituted during Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit to China, the SRs have had 23 rounds of talks, in which they have achieved one notable success: the formulation of an “Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question” signed in 2005.
On August 19, Doval and Wang met for the 24th round of discussions.
During the latest round of meetings, Wang and Prime Minister Narendra Modi set the stage for expanded talks at the highest level. Modi announced that he was looking forward to meeting China’s President Xi Jinping at Tianjin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leaders’ summit on August 31-September 1.
Creating a positive atmosphere for summitry outcomes, Delhi and Beijing agreed to resume direct flights, border trade and to expand trade and investments. At least three new border mechanisms were set up. And, quite unexpectedly, Taiwan emerged as an important diplomatic win for Wang.
Even as talks were underway in Delhi, it was reported in Beijing that External Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar had told Wang that “Taiwan is a part of China.” Meanwhile, Doval reportedly conveyed that “[India] consistently adheres to the one-China policy.
Hastening to clarify matters, officials in New Delhi denied any change in India’s position on Taiwan. New Delhi’s focus, they said, remained on Taiwan’s economy, technology and culture.
The first new border control mechanism emerged from Wang’s meeting with Doval. The MEA announced that it had been decided to set up an “expert group” under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) to explore an “early harvest in boundary delimitation” in the India-China border areas.
It was also agreed to set up a “working group” under the WMCC to “advance effective border management” in order to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas.
The third announcement was to create “General Level Mechanisms in Eastern and Middle Sectors,” in addition to the existing General Level Mechanism in the Western Sector. It was decided to hold an early meeting of the General Level Mechanism in the Western Sector.
Build Up of Tensions in Ladakh
The current situation on the Sino-Indian border in Eastern Ladakh has been building up for over five years. Since the spring of 2020, some 50,000-60,000 Chinese border guards and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers have remained deployed there, standing guard over 15,000-foot heights that, before 2020, were traditionally claimed and patrolled by India.
A similar number of Indian Army soldiers and armed policemen of the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP) also remain deployed in Eastern Ladakh to block further Chinese ingress.
This tense face-off began in April-May of 2020, when large PLA formations, which had been engaged in apparently routine summer training exercises, suddenly wheeled westwards and advanced along multiple thrust lines into Indian-claimed territory. The Chinese infantry was backed by artillery and air defense guns, engineer regiments, and even tank units.
The smaller numbers of Indian troops deployed for the defense of Ladakh were taken by surprise. Indian intelligence agencies had incorrectly assessed that, with the COVID-19 pandemic raging, China would act with restraint. It did not.
The top military commanders on both sides, led by officers of general rank, have held a total of 19 “Senior Commanders’ Meetings (SCM),” the most recent on August 13-14, 2023.
Initially denying that Chinese troops had breached the traditional border, Modi’s Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government found itself facing a simple question: If Chinese troops had not ingressed into Indian territory or breached the border, what then was the subject of discussions between the senior military commanders from both sides?
Eventually, India’s foreign ministry accepted the Chinese incursions, posting on its website: “Bilateral relations have been adversely impacted by incidents along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh in April-May 2020.”
Infrastructure Contest
China analyst Yun Sun of the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. writes that while antagonizing India does indeed carry the strategic downside for Beijing of confronting a large, influential and powerful neighbor over a barren stretch of mountainous terrain, China feels the need to stand up to India, even at a high cost. Beijing believes that its management of its border policies with India will have implications for its geopolitical ties with its neighbors.
In addition, Beijing believes that security on its borders will come from creating world-class infrastructure, particularly roads and tracks. At the strategic level, Beijing formulated China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016 to 2020), with new stipulations on the development of its border infrastructure. While previous plans focused on intra-regional roads in the vicinity of the border, the current planning prioritizes an inter-regional transportation network.
Such a border infrastructure policy also dovetails with China’s Belt and Road Initiative— Xi’s flagship foreign policy initiative that envisages expanding Chinese influence through global infrastructure development. Road construction toward India—along with North Korea, Myanmar, Russia, and Mongolia—is listed as one of the five priority areas. However, given the border disputes and confrontations with India since 2012, road construction in India’s direction has encountered severe problems, such as the 2017 Doklam standoff.
At the tactical level, China apparently wants to end the border infrastructure race with India. Strategically, however, it is in no hurry to resolve the infrastructure disputes, perceiving that they bog down India in its bid to be perceived as a continental power.
In some perspectives from Beijing, Chinese leaders see Indian infrastructure development in Eastern Ladakh as a repeated effort by Delhi that needs to be corrected every few years. This perspective bears similarities with Israel’s notion of periodically “mowing the lawn” in Gaza. It remains to be seen whether Beijing achieves greater success in this effort than Tel Aviv.
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